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ABSTRACT
Clinical sociology has a large, albeit under-appreciated, role to play
in helping individual clients. The types of problems addressed by helping
professionals can be classified in four major areas, namely physiological
problems, moral problems, problems in living, and role problems. These
are respectively best dealt with by medical, social control, problem-
solving, and resocialization solutions. Clinical sociology can contribute
to each of these owing to its expertise in social support, socialization,
resocialization, emotional competence, and moral competence.
As we approach the new millennium, it is remarkable mat the potential
which sociology possesses for aiding individual clients who are troubled by
personal problems has yet to be fully realized (Straus 1985). While
psychology, medicine, and social work are solidly established, clinical
sociology languishes in a backwater peopled chiefly by the sociological
cognoscenti. The public has learned about the benefits of family therapy, art
therapy, and even dance therapy, but the utility of a sociological perspective
in addressing personal distress remains largely undiscovered. Given that
much individual adversity can only be understood, or overcome, by
recognizing its social dimensions, mis is an astonishing failure.
In fact, clinical sociology speaks to a panoply of problem areas with a full
quiver of unique interventions (Rebach and Bruhn 1991). For several decades
now it has been expanding its domain of application, including areas
ordinarily considered non-social. In this paper I will essay to outline the full
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dimensions of an individual clinical sociology. I will begin with an overview
of the sorts of problems for which sociology can be of critical importance and
them proceed to an examination of some of its modes of operation.
Areas of Relevance
Traditional forms of solving personal problems have an almost ad hoc
quality (Fein 1992). Most have evolved over the course of this past century
within disciplines largely concerned with advancing a favored strategy. What
has generally been absent from their purviews is a panoramic overview
informed by a sociological sensibility. When, however, one stands back and
assumes a broad perspective, individual problems are rarely just personal. A
number of essential factors become immediately evident. Thus, individual
difficulties always have a social context (Billson 1994). They are either
created in social interactions, expressed in social circumstances, or corrected
through social relationships. This enables them to be distinguished form one
another along social dimensions. Once this is achieved, it is possible to
recognize that some avenues for solving them are more promising than others.
Instead of resorting to the "one-size-fits-all" mentality so common among
clinicians, it becomes apparent that specific strategies work better in specific
circumstances. In other words, for help to be effective, it must address a
correctly understood problem in a socially-related manner.
The following are the four primary types of individual trouble. They are
respectively: 1) the physiological, 2) the moral, 3) problems in living, and 4)
role problems. While this list is not exhaustive, it covers most of the territory
dealt with in the helping professions. What is especially important is mat
each hem has a distinctive source and, therefore, a different resolution. Only
by understanding these differences can clinicians assist in providing effective
relief.
A) The first type of problem, the physiological, has a biological basis.
These difficulties are occasioned by the body machinery behaving in ways
that can be personally painful. Physical illnesses, genetic defects, and
corporal accidents fall into this category. Nowadays there is tendency to
attribute almost any form of distress to one of these causes (Kramer 1993).
Everything from schizophrenia to depression—including the conduct
disorders—is routinely chalked up to "chemical imbalances" and them
ministered to with palliative medications (e.g., the prozac phenomenon).
Despite an overwhelming lack of evidence that neurotransmitters, or genes,
are responsible for the bulk of our personal suffering, the assumptions is mat
further research will inevitably demonstrate that virtually all individual
distress has a biological foundation.
We in sociology are naturally quick to take umbrage at this suggestion.
Because we are familiar with the potency of social causes, these tend to be the
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first to which we look. And yet there are physiological disorders that do
require medical interventions. Schizophrenia surely has biological
underpinnings. Sociologists once believed that schizophrenigenic mothers
were this condition's primary antecedent, but this has been largely disproved.
Also disproved has been a crude labeling theory that attributes hallucinations
and delusions to the agency of social stigmatization. Schizophrenics can
indeed benefit from medications in ways that they do not benefit from social
manipulations. As a result, neither biology nor medicine can automatically be
discounted in favor of strictly interpersonal interventions.
B) The second sort of problem, which is often confused with the first,
can be utterly different When sociologists talk about the "medicalization of
deviance," they have in mind treating moral difficulties as physical ones
(Gupta 1993). The DSM IV (APA, 1994) is the primary exemplar of
interpreting virtually all forms of human distress as based upon biological
disorder (Kirk & Kutchins 1992). Although some current research points to
the genetic origins of social violence, most interpersonal nastiness has no
demonstrable physiological underpinning. Still, whether we are discussing the
truancy of school children or the obtuseness of narcissistic personalities,
persons who exhibit moral problems can be difficult to tolerate. Their
exorbitant demands and insensitive actions alienate most of those with whom
they interact In short, they are not nice people. The real question is,
therefore, what sort of problem are they? Although such malefactors can
accurately be described as having broken important rules, this must not be
confused with their having been impelled to delinquency by physiology. To
be a problem, is not necessarily to be a "medical" problem. Rule breaking is a
distinctive category that requires separate recognition. It can flow from causes
quite apart from a disordered biology, for example, from something as simple
as a desire to do harm. The fact is that these often social motives, and not just
body chemistry, must be independently investigated.
Interestingly, moral problems are not usually perceived as such by those
who perpetrate them. As rule breakers, the difficulties they create are largely
visited upon others. It is these who find their behaviors objectionable and who
wish mem to change. In particular, it is not the distress of the troublemaker,
but that of his or her role partners that they wish to diminish. The appropriate
solution to moral problems may, therefore, be social control. The central goal
is then to extinguish immoral behaviors, not to make the perpetrator feel
better. Pills that reduce guilt would thus be counterproductive. Quite the
contrary, "bad guys" must be made to desist from their mischief whether or
not they wish to. Such help as is rendered is primarily to the victim, not the
wrongdoer.
C) In the next sort of problem, the focus returns to the person
experiencing distress. As we all know, things go wrong in life. Marriages fall
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apart and houses are destroyed by hurricanes. Children may not grow up as
their parents would like, while at work many people fail to achieve their most
cherished aspirations. In general, we human beings confront two sorts of
problems in living (Szasz 1961). The first may be considered normal
problems. Because life is hard, we are all subject to relationship difficulties
and are all buffeted by the demands of maturation. These often hurt and at
times can be so severe that people cannot cope on their own. This is when
they become problems. The second sort of difficulty in living is the abnormal,
that is, the catastrophic problem. Not everyone suffers the trauma of war or
the heartache of a severely disabled child, and yet, for those who do, the pain
can be excruciating. When such crises arrive, they may understandably
crumble. At such moments, they may cry out for help.
Naturally, those who are burdened by problems in living want to survive,
and, if possible, prevail. Therefore, when their own resources prove
inadequate, they can benefit from social support (Frank 1973). Sometimes
hand-holding goes a long way. A positive social relationship can give people
the courage to endure. Most of us know how comforting it is to be understood
and are grateful when valued others refuse to abandon us during the hard
times. We become stronger when their strength is transferred to us. This may
not seem like much to outsiders, but the beneficiaries recognize that these
contributions can be pivotal.
Likewise, people are helped when they receive assistance in solving
specific problems. It should not be surprising that when something is broken,
fixing it can be the answer. In consequence, the best response to a life
problem can be problem-solving. If a person loses a job, getting a new one
relieves distress; if a relationship deteriorates, correcting or replacing it can be
the appropriate tonic. Achieving goals is wonderfully therapeutic. Although
this is not always possible, helpers who facilitate it are invaluable.
D) The last type of individual problem, namely the role problem (Fein
1990), is often conflated with problems in living. Yet there are profound
differences. The latter sort of predicament seems to happen to us. Neither
normal, nor abnormal, difficulties in living seem to be the fault of the victim.
As we all know, the world has rhythms that are beyond individual control.
When fate chooses a target, the casualty may be blameless but hurt
nevertheless. Role problems, in contrast, have an internal locus of control.
They arise because of a person's own actions, not those of the outside world.
An example may help. Suppose a person loses a job because he has a conflict
with his boss. It may be that the boss is an obnoxious person or that their
respective personalities do not jibe. In either case, the victim is merely
unlucky. If, however, the person gets a new job, then finds himself embroiled
in a similar conflict, the odds are that he has generated his own troubles.
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Role problems can be distinguished from others by their repetitive
character (Freud 1953-74). They are recapitulated endlessly with only slight
modifications in a plethora of varying circumstances. People seem to develop
ways of behaving that they reenact regardless of their surroundings. If these
patterns are beneficial, their sponsors prosper, but if they are not, they carry
around their personal dark clouds. Hence, those who are raised in abusive
relationships may later in life seek out equally abusive partners. Again and
again, they will find themselves cheated, betrayed, or ignored. When they do,
despite having authored their own misfortune, it will hurt - often very badly.
Role problems may be under a person's control, but when they are operative,
they do not feel that way to the victim.
In the case of role problems, the appropriate solution is not merely
enduring, but changing the offending patterns of interaction. It is not
sufficient to extricate oneself from a bad situation if one has a tendency to
recreate it elsewhere. What must happen is for a person's internal motives to
be rearranged. Old role relationships have to be abandoned, and new ones
introduced in their stead. This process has a recognizable course. Indeed, it
has a name. It is called resocialization. It may also be referred to as role
change. Generally, mis mechanism constitutes the basis of what is referred to
as psychotherapy. In this guise, it is typically thought of as pertaining to the
individual. Nonetheless, a social perspective makes it plain that dysfunctional
roles are generated in social interaction. Usually, they are created in coercive
relationships and can be corrected only in a social settings that reverse these
constraints. There is not the space here to describe the process in its entirety,
but it entails a) reexperiencing painful roles, b) relinquishing the role scripts
mat hold them in place, and, finally, c) renegotiating superior replacements.
Unless all three are achieved, dysfunctional patterns tend to resurface at the
most inopportune moments.
To recapitulate, these four areas of application together cover a great deal
of the clinical terrain. Distinguishing between them makes it apparent that not
all discomfort has the same origin. Personal unhappiness may seem to be
uniform, but understanding the diversity of its sources is essential. This,
however, is possible only for those who clearly apprehend the social causes
and consequences involved.
Modes of Intervention
Specifically sociological approaches to solving socially generated
problems are legion. Once again, it is impossible to discuss them all, but a
representative sample demonstrates how an interpersonal perspective enlarges
the repertoire available to the individually oriented clinician. The techniques
that follow can be applied to each of the problem areas presented above.
How, and in what measure, will, however, vary with the problem and its
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context Some modalities, like social support, are broadly applicable, while
others, such as role change, have a more limited relevance. Deciding which is
likely to be most useful is itself part of a clinician's professional expertise.
Social Support. Not just problems in living, but medical, moral, and role
problems all benefit from social support. People in distress often flounder
because their problems terrify them. Whether the source of their fear is a
physiological condition or a self-generated relationship, they race headlong
into further suffering because they are too frightened even to perceive the
springs of their distress. As a consequence, social reassurance can have a very
general utility. Often people forget that therapeutic interventions are
inherently social. Fundamental to all sorts of professional help is that which
flows from the nature of a positive relationship.
Nevertheless, useful support is difficult to provide. It can be
uncomfortable to be with someone who is suffering and challenging to supply
such a person with the assurance he requires. This is where a sociological
background can come in handy. By understanding the social roots of a client's
terrors, a sociological practitioner can increase the chances of being reliably
supportive. Social solidarity is not merely a matter of good intentions, but of
appropriate communications and insightful validation. For instance, a well-
meaning helper may assume that assuring a person that his reactions are
normal is always sound. If, however, they are not, this assertion can prove
disastrous. It may convince the client not that the helper is supportive, but that
she is manipulative. For a validation to be believed, it needs to reinforce what
is true. Otherwise, it will seem insincere. Sociology, of course, is an excellent
vehicle for determining what is actually true.
An example of a valid supportive intervention is found in the work of
Sarah Brabant (1996). She has developed considerable expertise in the
management of grief. When people experience extreme losses, their reactions
can be excessive and difficult to overcome on their own. They can undergo a
depression so debilitating that it is literally life threatening. Brabant addresses
this difficulty by recognizing the gap torn in a person's world by such a loss.
Utilising the analogy of a torn fabric, she guides her clients in mending that
which has been ripped asunder. Her firm, but socially informed, support,
enables them to gather the strength they need to persevere on their own.
A less obvious area in which socially sensitive support is useful is mental
health. Those suffering from mental disorders almost automatically find then-
social relationships placed under stress. Their behaviors and emotional
reactions can seem so odd, and/or demanding, that they are off-putting to their
role partners. Those suffering from a bipolar disorder, for instance, can
experience mood swings so extreme that those in contact with them do not
know how to react, instead of being supportive, the latter may demand
changes which make it even more difficult for the victim to cope. The work
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of Beverley Cuthbertson Johnson (Cuthbertson Johnson and Gagan 1993) has
addressed this dilemma in a number of ways. One of the techniques she has
pioneered is guiding family groups in providing emotional sustenance for
those with this particular malady. By helping these intermediaries understand
why their loved ones behave as they do, she brings about social adjustments
that serve to make life easier for all concerned.
Socialization. Often successful problem-solving, but also moral living,
depends upon the possession of relevant skills. A woman may want to be a
wonderful mother, but not know how to discipline her child, or a man seek
professional success, yet misunderstand the nature of organizational politics.
In either event, their good intentions may be impossible to implement. Social
sciences such as psychology tend to imply that interpersonal skills can be
automatically acquired by those who desire them. As a result, they
concentrate on altering the cognitions or emotions they regard as causative and
tend to neglect social learning. The truth is, however, that learning skills often
entails complicated interpersonal understandings. For instance, in order to
navigate complex organizations, one can benefit from recognizing their
hierarchical nature. Bureaucracies possess an inner logic that is opaque to
those who are naive about their operations. Likewise, families are not just
collections of related people. They too possess dynamics that may not be
immediately obvious. Because sociology has at its foundation the study of
phenomena such as family interactions, social class disparities, and
organizational structures, it is ideally suited to teaching real-world skills.
Non-sociologists may mistakenly dismiss these as common sense, but they do
so at their peril. A failure to recognize the implications of cultural, or
structural, factors is a strong predictor of ineffectual conduct
On a general level, Janet Mancini Billson (1994) has pointed out that
understanding the social life of people, including those grappling with
personal problems, entails understanding the web of interpersonal
communications in which they are enmeshed. Because we human beings are
symbol users, it is imperative to recognize the symbolic interactions that
surround us. Furthermore, because society and self are inseparable, it is
impossible to understand individuals without understanding the socially
derived concepts with which they define themselves. Thus, helping clients to
perceive their symbolic activities can facilitate an ability to perceive who they
are and what they might choose to do differently in their lives. It can,
therefore, convert them into persons who have control over their own
destinies.
Resocialization Counseling. Resocialization is not just a form of personal
change; it is also a mode of facilitating such change (Fein 1990; Fein 1992).
Replacing distressing roles can be both a lengthy and painful process.
Relinquishing and supplanting dysfunctional interpersonal patterns is
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inherently stressful and inevitably protracted. Competence in facilitating it is,
therefore, hard to achieve, and doubly so for those who do not recognize its
overall structure. Because other disciplines concentrate on isolated feelings
and disembodied cognitions, they tend to miss the natural personal, and
interpersonal, sequences that are involved. Instead of recognizing that a
protest phase may be heralded by a resistance to role loss, or that a period of
profound sadness can indicate the severing of role ties, they prefer to describe
unconnected anxieties and irrational depressions. Without a role context, the
bits and pieces of resocialization seem distinct and senseless. In consequence,
traditional therapists, rather than expedite the process, often impede it. As
significantly, a social overview is essential to enabling clients to understand
and determine their own fate. Resocialization is not magic and need not be
mysterious. Once the victims of role dysfunction recognize why they are in
distress and how they can escape it, they need not defer to medical or
psychological authorities. Instead, they can assume responsibility for their-
own growth.
Conscious efforts at resocialization involve the three phases mentioned
earlier (Fein 1990). The first entails identifying and re-experiencing the role
problems in which a person is trapped. Since these roles are invariably
painful, most people prefer to suppress them. Nevertheless change cannot
occur unless their efforts at denial are attacked and breached. Being able to
feel me terror of coerced behaviors, or the anger of lingering frustrations, is
vital to being able to fix what has gone wrong. All too often people fail to
improve their situation because they are trapped in fighting old battles in the
same old way.
The second stage in resocialization requires a person to relinquish roles
that are broken. Before a person can replace dysfunctional patterns, they must
be set aside. This, however, is more difficult than might at first blush appear.
Because it typically involves a substantial loss, a period of intense grief is
required. This is the sine qua non for breaking attachments to that which is no
longer viable. But such grief can be devastating. It can almost feel like death.
As a consequence, navigating it without doing additional damage often
demands the assistance of a skilled escort The sociologically informed
clinician can be such a cicerone if he/she is familiar with the underlying
process.
Lastly, new and more satisfying roles can be substituted for those that are
lost. This, however, entails the construction of fresh interpersonal behaviors.
Non-sociologists often overlook the fact mat social roles are negotiated affairs.
They assume that people can simply be what they like without having to work
through their parts with role partners. Were people social isolates, this might
be true, but because what we require is the cooperation of others, a process of
demand and counter-demand is necessary before the parties can agree to
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patterns in which they both participate. Engaging in this give-and-take
competently is essential to arriving at mutually gratifying arrangements.
Emotional Competence. For some reason, emotions often seem aberrant.
As common as they are, people seem to imagine that they merely happen. It is
as if their feelings occurred inside them, but in places that cannot be touched.
Most people do not seem to realize that in order to be effective, feelings must
be socialized (Lewis and Saarni 1985; Goleman 1995). They do not recognize
that a major part of becoming an adult is learning to harness the
communication and motivation functions of their feelings so that they can
achieve the goals that emotions alone give us the power to accomplish.
Emotions, however, are not thoughts; nor are they asocial. They are an
instrumentality unto themselves, which must be understood and dealt with on
their own terms. As a crucial element in our internal machinery, they enable
us to perform essential interpersonal tasks. Their energy and persistence have
no substitute when it comes to influencing the social environment. As a result,
mature adults would be wise to learn how to control their passions so that they
can be used to achieve vital ends. Only men will it be possible for them to
engage in truly successful human relationships. Only then can they engage in
fully moral actions or initiate significant personal change.
Daniel Goleman has misleadingly recommended what he calls EQ, that is,
emotional intelligence. Yet were this concept relabeled "emotional maturity,"
it would fit quite nicely with the social needs of those suffering from personal
problems. As Goleman has noted (1995), in order to be successful in life,
people need to be able to 1) understand their emotions, 2) manage their
emotions, 3) motivate themselves, 4) recognize the emotions of others, and 5)
handle the emotional aspects of relationships. It is the combination of these
skills that enables them to avoid the misunderstandings and conflicts that
result from ignoring the emotional dimensions of their behaviors.
Of particular import to those struggling with personal problems is an
ability to cope with intense emotions. When feelings like anger and fear go
out of control, they can wreck havoc. A sociologically informed program like
IAM (Integrated Anger Management) (Fein 1993) enables people to take a
step by step approach to overcoming their rage or terror. By recognizing mat
emotions are social phenomena, it can help them a) achieve physical safety, b)
develop incremental tolerance to their feelings, c) evaluate what they are
doing and with what effect, d) relinquish what does not work, and e) use their
emotions to achieve what is vitally important
Moral Competence. It has been more than a century since Emile
Durkheim (1961) taught us that moral rules are socially constructed.
Nevertheless most people still seem to believe they are non-natural facts that
are either known or not known. Few people recognize that their values are, in
large part, within their own control. They do not comprehend that the rules to
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which they commit themselves are socially negotiated and emotionally
enforced. This means that they can assume responsibility for their own moral
development, if they so choose. It is, in fact, up to them whether they will be
morally competent.
In most areas of human distress misplaced values play a vital role. Their
part in moral difficulties is obvious, but many problems in living, and role
problems, are exacerbated by the retention of outworn moral allegiances.
Inappropriate guilt or shame can trap people in behavioral patterns that are
inimical to their interests. The first step in solving these difficulties may
therefore be to examine and overhaul their values systems. Otherwise, people
can sabotage their own needs, as well as those of their peers. Instead of
committing themselves to rules that have positive consequences, they battle
each other with undue ferocity, inflicting grievous damage on others, while
having the same visited upon themselves. In this case, they will be morally
inept, the inventors of their own problems in living and the creators of their
own vapid social roles. In order to avoid such an eventuality, people need to
understand the social nature of morality, recognize their place in the process,
and acquire the strengths needed to change what must be changed.
Again to allude to my own work, familiarity with the negotiation/emotion
paradigm (NEP) (Fein 1997) makes it possible to escape a wealth of moral
abuses and manipulations. Ironically, because morality is supposed to be
pure, people may not recognize when it is used to create gratuitous pain. They
may not understand, for instance, that morality's dialectical character fosters
polarized negotiations in which a good-guy/bad-guy mentality can rob the
participants of their desire to be fair. Instead of listening to each other's point
of view, they cease paying attention on the assumption that whatever a bad
guy says must be wrong and is probably corrupting. This, however, can breed
excesses and rigidities from which all will suffer. Without a conscious
understanding of what one is doing, morality stops being a guardian and
becomes a source of ill in its own right
Conclusion
All in all, sociology can play a crucial role in serving the needs of the
individual client This is not to detract from the discipline's contributions to
correcting the dysfunctions found in social institutions and organizations. It is
a call for expanding the field's recognized area of application. We human
beings are, and always will be, social creatures. We may sometimes appear to
be isolated from one another, but we are never completely alone. Any attempt
to render help that treats people as merely biological or psychological is
therefore doomed. Likewise, social solutions that deny our separate humanity
fare no better. In truth, we are individuals, but individuals in a social context.
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Neither we, nor our potential clients, can afford to neglect so powerful an
insight for doing social good.
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